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Th is paper presents a critical overview of the Guideline on 
Vulnerable Persons, adopted by Canada’s  Immigration 
and Refugee Board (IRB) in December 2006 with the goal 
of providing procedural accommodations for vulnerable 
individuals appearing before the Board so that they are 
not disadvantaged in presenting their cases. Although the 
Guideline is a step in the right direction, it has several ser-
ious shortcomings, notably the fact that it is purely proced-
ural in scope, applies only to persons whose ability to present 
their case is severely impaired, and does not give suffi  cient 
weight to expert opinions by mental health professionals.
Résumé
Cet article propose un coup d’œil critique sur le document 
Directives sur les procédures concernant les personnes vul-
nérables qui comparaissent devant la CISR, adopté par la 
Commission de l’immigration et du statut de réfugié du 
Canada en décembre 2006 dans le but de fournir des accom-
modements en matière de procédure pour les personnes vul-
nérables appelées devant la Commission, et cela afi n qu’elles 
ne soient pas désavantagées  pour présenter leurs cas. Bien 
que la Directive soit un pas dans la bonne direction, elle 
a plusieurs manquements sérieux, notamment le fait que 
sa portée est limitée en matière de procédures seulement, 
qu’elle ne s’applique uniquement qu’aux personnes qui ont 
des handicaps graves pour présenter leur cas, et n’accorde 
pas suffi  samment d’importance à l’opinion d’expert présen-
tée par les professionnels en matière de santé mentale.
Introduction
For many years, refugee advocates and mental health pro-
fessionals have demanded that Canadian immigration au-
thorities adopt policies to meet the needs of psychologic-
ally vulnerable asylum seekers and permanent residents. 
On December 15, 2006, Canada’s Immigration and Refugee 
Board (IRB or Board) issued a guideline designed to re-
spond to some of these concerns, Guideline on Procedures 
with Respect to Vulnerable Persons Appearing Before the IRB 
(Guideline on Vulnerable Persons, or Guideline 8).1
Psychological vulnerability may detrimentally aff ect asy-
lum seekers and permanent residents in a variety of ways. 
First, it may aff ect the person’s ability to coherently and per-
suasively present her case before the IRB. Procedural changes 
(e.g., allowing a support person to be present) will oft en be 
helpful but may not be suffi  cient to overcome this disadvan-
tage. For example, a person who has experienced torture or 
rape may well have diffi  culty telling her story to the Board 
despite procedural adjustments. Her account may still be 
marred by inconsistencies, vagueness, omissions, late disclo-
sure, apparent lack of emotion, or other characteristics that 
can easily be mistaken for signs of untruthfulness. To ensure 
that vulnerable persons are not disadvantaged in presenting 
their case, it is therefore essential to take psychological prob-
lems into account when assessing the person’s credibility in 
addition to allowing procedural accommodations.
Second, psychological problems may aff ect the person’s 
ability to seek state protection or to relocate, and should 
therefore be considered when analyzing these aspects of the 
refugee claim. Th ird, some permanent residents or refugees 
may face removal for mental health related criminal off enses 
such as an assault committed while in the grip of psychot-
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ic delusions or a robbery linked to drug addiction. In such 
cases, it would seem reasonable to take diminished respon-
sibility into account. Fourth, psychological vulnerability 
should be considered in deciding whether a detained asylum 
seeker should be transferred to a community facility or re-
leased under a bond.2 In the United Kingdom, for example, 
it is now unlawful to detain asylum seekers who have been 
tortured.3
Finally, the heightened vulnerability of psychologically 
disturbed persons is a relevant factor when assessing the risks 
they would face if returned to their country of origin. For 
example, a Roma woman who had suff ered for years from 
severe depression, anxiety, and agoraphobia following an at-
tack by skinheads was found to have compelling reasons not 
to return to Hungary, although the risks that she would face 
there would not amount to persecution for a less psycho-
logically fragile person.4 Similarly, the claim of an Ethiopian 
asylum seeker with chronic bipolar disorder and a history of 
suicide attempts was accepted on the grounds that the severe 
stigmatization and discrimination that she would experience 
in Ethiopia because of her mental illness amounted to per-
secution.5
Th ese are just some examples of the many problems 
faced by vulnerable persons seeking status in Canada. Th e 
Guideline on Procedures with Respect to Vulnerable Persons 
Appearing Before the IRB (Guideline 8) addresses only one 
of these issues, that of procedural adjustments designed to 
attenuate some of the diffi  culties faced by vulnerable persons 
during IRB procedures. Although a praiseworthy initiative, 
the Guideline therefore falls far short of responding to all the 
needs of vulnerable persons appearing before the IRB.
In this paper, I fi rst present a critical summary of Guideline 
8, followed by an analysis of IRB and Federal Court decisions 
involving the Guideline. In a third section, I briefl y critique 
the assumption expressed in Guideline 8 that serious vulner-
ability is exceptional among asylum seekers. Finally, I refute 
a number of misconceptions concerning reports by mental 
health professionals contained in the IRB Training Manual 
on Victims of Torture.6
Critical Overview of Guideline 8
Defi nition of Vulnerable Persons
Vulnerable persons are defi ned as “individuals whose ability 
to present their cases before the IRB is severely impaired,”7 
but also as individuals who have “severe diffi  culty in going 
through the hearing process or other IRB processes without 
special consideration being given to their individual situa-
tions,”8 which appears to be a somewhat broader standard. 
Th e main goal of procedural accommodations is to ensure 
that “the person is not disadvantaged in the presentation of 
their case,”9 which indicates that the focus is more on en-
suring fairness than on minimizing distress. However, an-
other objective is to “prevent vulnerable persons from be-
ing traumatized or re-traumatized by the hearing process 
or other IRB process.”10 Th is suggests that the Board should 
be prepared to adjust its procedures if the regular process is 
likely to cause signifi cant distress, even if the person may be 
reasonably able to testify.
Th is more liberal interpretation is consistent with the 
remedial aim of Guideline 8. For example, a refugee claim-
ant who is very reluctant to recount her rape may be able to 
overcome her reluctance and tell her story, but at the cost of 
reviving suicidal urges. In this instance, the person is ultim-
ately able to present her case, but at a tremendous cost to her 
psychological integrity. An overly narrow interpretation of 
the Guideline focusing exclusively on impairment of the per-
son’s ability to present her case could lead to a refusal to rec-
ognize such a person as vulnerable and a failure to provide 
procedural accommodations that were in fact needed. 
Vulnerability may be due to a variety of factors,11 includ-
ing (but not limited to):
experiential factors, notably having experienced or • 
witnessed torture, genocide, rape, gender-related 
persecution or other severe mistreatment; and
innate or acquired personal characteristics such as • 
age, mental or physical illness, or mental or physical 
handicap.
Th e Guideline states repeatedly that many of the individ-
uals appearing before the IRB experience some degree of 
vulnerability and have diffi  culty going through the process 
for reasons such as language and cultural barriers, previous 
traumatic experiences, or the profound impact that the IRB 
decision may have on the person’s life.12 Having recognized 
these facts, the IRB could logically have concluded that a 
large proportion of those appearing before it may need some 
form of procedural accommodation. Instead, the Guideline 
emphasizes that it applies only to “the more severe cases of 
vulnerability” involving “diffi  culties which go beyond those 
that are common to most persons appearing before the 
IRB,”13 while asserting that the IRB should treat everyone 
appearing before it with sensitivity and respect.14
If a signifi cant proportion of individuals appearing before 
the IRB are, in fact, vulnerable, why not recognize them as 
such? Most of the procedural accommodations envisaged in 
Guideline 8 are not particularly taxing for the system. Why 
restrict them to cases in which the person’s ability to present 
their case is severely impaired? Surely procedural accommo-
dations should be allowed whenever there is reason to be-
lieve that they might make it easier for the person to tell their 
story or simply decrease the person’s level of distress.  Instead 
of setting such a high threshold for recognition as a vulner-
able person it would seem to make more sense to set a lower 
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initial threshold, but then to take into account the relative 
severity of the person’s impairment when deciding whether 
measures with broader systemic implications, such as prior-
ity scheduling, are warranted.
Identifi cation of Vulnerable Persons
A person may be identifi ed as vulnerable at any stage of the 
proceedings, preferably at the earliest opportunity.15 Th e 
member assigned to hear the case on the merits is not bound 
by an identifi cation made prior to the hearing.16 Th us, the 
assigned member can recognize a person’s vulnerability and 
order procedural adjustments even if this was refused be-
fore the hearing, but can also reverse a pre-hearing decision 
identifying the person as vulnerable. Th is latter perspective 
is liable to generate anxiety for the vulnerable person, which 
would seem to defeat the purpose of pre-hearing identifi ca-
tion. It is to be hoped that assigned members will refrain 
from modifying pre-hearing decisions unless new evidence 
has been submitted.
Designated Representative
A designated representative will only be appointed if the 
person is either under eighteen years of age or unable to ap-
preciate the nature of the proceedings,17 a standard which is 
considerably narrower than the criteria for recognition as a 
vulnerable person.18 In a number of cases, the Board has re-
fused to appoint a designated representative but has gone on 
to recognize that the person was vulnerable and allowed pro-
cedural accommodations.19 On the other hand, if an adult’s 
ability to understand the proceedings is so impaired as to 
warrant the appointment of a designated representative, she 
is necessarily also severely impaired in her ability to present 
her case and should automatically be considered vulnerable.
Nature of Procedural Accommodations
Th e Board has “a broad discretion to tailor procedures to 
meet the particular needs of a vulnerable person”20 such as 
allowing the person’s lawyer to proceed fi rst, allowing the 
presence of a support person, creating a more informal set-
ting, or “any other procedural accommodation that may be 
reasonable in the circumstances”.21 Proceedings involving 
vulnerable persons should generally be scheduled on a pri-
ority basis given that the anxiety generated by delays may 
be particularly detrimental for such persons.22 When ques-
tioning a vulnerable person, the Board must “attempt to 
avoid traumatizing or re-traumatizing” the person.23 More 
specifi cally, Board members and Refugee Protection Offi  cers 
are encouraged to adopt the approach outlined in the IRB’s 
Training Manual on Victims of Torture in all cases involving 
vulnerable persons.24 Th e Training Manual will be discussed 
in greater detail below.
Establishing Vulnerability: Expert Reports and Other 
Forms of Evidence
Although an expert report or other independent credible 
evidence is the preferred way to prove vulnerability,25 this 
is not obligatory.26 In several cases, the IRB has concluded 
that a person was vulnerable based on a letter from counsel 
describing behaviour consistent with mental health prob-
lems. Th ere have also been cases in which the Board recog-
nized the person as vulnerable and ordered an early hearing 
on its own initiative based simply on the claimant’s Personal 
Information Form (PIF) as well as behaviour observed by 
Board staff .27 Th e absence of expert evidence will not neces-
sarily lead to a negative inference concerning vulnerability; 
the Board must consider whether it was “reasonably possible” 
to obtain such evidence.28 It remains to be seen whether the 
oft en prohibitive cost of an expert assessment will be taken 
into account when deciding whether it was reasonably pos-
sible to submit such evidence.
Th e decision as to whether a person is vulnerable and 
needs procedural accommodations will almost always be 
made before the hearing on the merits begins, and therefore 
before the Board has had the opportunity to assess the per-
son’s credibility.29  Th e Guideline clearly envisages that the 
decision as to vulnerability will generally be made on the 
basis of allegations whose credibility has not been tested.30 
Indeed, it specifi es that identifying a person as vulnerable 
does not imply that the underlying facts are true or that the 
case is well-founded.31
On the other hand, the Guideline also states, “Th e weight 
given to the [expert’s] report will depend, among other 
things, on the credibility of the underlying facts in support 
of the allegation of vulnerability.32 Th is rule is relevant when 
the Board is deciding the merits of the case aft er hearing the 
claimant’s testimony, although oft en applied too restrictively. 
However, it will rarely be relevant to a Guideline 8 applica-
tion. At this stage of the proceedings the Board is not dealing 
with issues that lie within its exclusive jurisdiction, namely 
assessment of the person’s credibility and of the merits of 
their claim, but rather with an issue that is primarily within 
the fi eld of expertise of mental health professionals, name-
ly psychological impairment. In almost all cases involving 
Guideline 8 applications, the Board has not had the oppor-
tunity to hear the applicant and assess her credibility, so it is 
hard to see on what basis the Board can override the conclu-
sions of a mental health professional who has interviewed or 
treated the person and reached the professional opinion that 
she is psychologically fragile.
In short, if a qualifi ed mental health professional submits a 
reasonably detailed report based on an assessment conducted 
according to professional standards and concludes that the 
person has mental health problems likely to impair her abil-
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ity to present her case, this should be treated as conclusive 
proof of vulnerability for the purpose of procedural accom-
modations. On the other hand, the decision as to which pro-
cedural accommodations are appropriate remains within the 
Board’s discretion insofar as it involves balancing the needs 
of the vulnerable claimant and the limitations inherent to 
Board resources and procedures, although signifi cant weight 
should be given to the mental health professional’s sugges-
tions in this regard. 
Th e fact that a person is initially identifi ed as vulnerable 
does not prevent the Board member assigned to the case 
from rejecting the person’s claim on the merits.33 Conversely, 
the decision regarding vulnerability should be kept separate 
from the merits of the case. A person may be genuinely in 
need of procedural accommodations even if there are indica-
tions that her case is not well-founded. Th e right to proced-
ural accommodations is based on the right to a fair hearing 
irrespective of the merits of the case. Even if there are serious 
inconsistencies or defects in pre-hearing procedures, this 
should not be taken into account when deciding an applica-
tion for procedural accommodations, precisely because such 
inconsistencies or defects may well be linked to the person’s 
impairment. For example, if an asylum seeker fails to dis-
close sexual abuse until shortly before the hearing or makes 
contradictory statements, this should not be held against her 
when deciding whether she is vulnerable.
Decisions Involving Guideline 8 
Th e IRB does not formally track decisions involving Guideline 
8, so no precise fi gures are available. However, an informal 
tracking mechanism initiated in mid-2007 shows that there 
have been very few applications under the Guideline since 
its adoption. Refugee Protection Division (RPD) records 
indicate that, as of May 2008, there had been approximately 
twenty-four decisions in Montreal concerning applications 
to have a person declared vulnerable, twenty-one in Toronto, 
and thirteen in Vancouver.34 Th is is a tiny number, especially 
compared to the number of decisions rendered by the RPD 
each year. Although no fi gures were available for the other 
two IRB divisions, the situation there appears to be similar. 
Note that it is impossible to track cases in which Guideline 8 
may have been cited orally during a hearing in support of a 
request for some form of procedural adjustment if this was 
not mentioned in the fi nal decision.  
Th e dearth of applications under Guideline 8 is all the 
more surprising given that very few have been refused. 
According to the internal RPD fi gures mentioned above, two 
out of twenty-four applications were refused in Montreal, 
two out of twenty-one in Toronto, and three out of thirteen 
in Vancouver, for an overall refusal rate of about 8 per cent. 
Furthermore, in several cases in which the Board refused to 
identify the person as vulnerable, it nonetheless made cer-
tain procedural accommodations. Th ese fi gures suggest that 
there is a willingness on the part of the Board to make pro-
cedural accommodations where warranted, and that counsel 
should perhaps consider making greater use of Guideline 8 
when there is reason to believe that the client is likely to have 
serious diffi  culty dealing with IRB proceedings.
For the period between December 2006 and July 2008, 
I found35 eleven cases citing Guideline 8,36 including an 
RPD decision and two Federal Court decisions which I will 
discuss in greater detail because they illustrate some of the 
Guideline’s potential limitations.
Refugee Protection Division Decision
In a domestic violence case involving a fi ft y-seven-year-old 
Zimbabwean woman, the Board refused to recognize the ap-
plicant’s vulnerability despite a detailed report in which the 
psychologist posed a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disor-
der (PTSD) with signifi cant depressive symptoms, affi  rming 
that the claimant had “experienced fl ashback and aversive 
emotional arousal during the interview” and that she had 
concentration and memory problems which would prob-
ably be exacerbated during the hearing.37 Th e Coordinating 
Member wrote:
I am not satisfi ed that the claimant’s ability to present her case 
has been severely impaired within the meaning of subsection 
2.1. Th e Guideline is not intended to apply to every case in 
which there has been serious trauma nor does it automatically 
apply in every case where PTSD (or other relevant disorder) has 
been diagnosed. Th ere is no evidence in the present case of dif-
fi culties that are particularly severe or that cannot be handled in 
the usual manner. It simply does not meet the threshold under 
the Guideline.38
Th e member nonetheless accepted most of the procedural 
accommodations requested (female panel, informal hear-
ing), but based his decision on the Guideline on Gender-
Based Persecution rather than the Guideline on Vulnerable 
Persons.
Th is decision clearly illustrates the problems posed by the 
provisions limiting application of the Guideline to the “more 
severe cases of vulnerability”39 in which the person’s ability 
to present their case is “severely impaired.”40 In practice, the 
Board recognized that the claimant was in need of procedur-
al accommodations, but refused to identify her as vulnerable 
under Guideline 8 for the sole reason that she was no more 
vulnerable than many other claimants. In my view, this re-
sult is completely contrary to the objectives of the Guideline. 
However, the fundamental problem lies not with the Board 
member’s interpretation of the threshold criteria, although I 
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fi nd it unduly restrictive, but rather with the criteria them-
selves.
As discussed above, restricting application of Guideline 8 
to the very severely impaired is unfair. If there is credible evi-
dence that the person is likely to have diffi  culty presenting 
her case before the Board, how can the fact that many other 
claimants experience similar diffi  culties justify a refusal to 
grant procedural accommodations that could help the per-
son to more eff ectively present her case or simply reduce her 
distress? Th e decision to identify a person as vulnerable and 
to grant appropriate procedural accommodations should be 
based on the individual’s limitations and needs, not on rank-
ing the person on a scale of relative severity of impairment 
compared to other claimants. In other words, the fact that a 
large number of claimants may suff er from PTSD, depres-
sion, anxiety, or other forms of vulnerability cannot ration-
ally justify refusal of procedural accommodations to those 
who actually need them simply because their level of impair-
ment is unexceptional. 
Th is decision also illustrates the potential for error in-
herent in allowing a Board member to override a mental 
health professional’s report on an issue at the heart of the 
latter’s expertise, psychological impairment, especially with-
out having heard the claimant. Th e above-cited case of the 
Zimbabwean woman illustrates this point. Th e Board con-
cluded that there was no reason to believe that her problems 
were particularly severe. To a mental health professional, 
however, her symptoms sound quite serious, particularly 
the fact that she displayed “fl ashback and aversive emo-
tional arousal”41 during the assessment interview. In clear, 
this indicates that as she was sitting in the psychologist’s 
offi  ce recounting her traumatic experiences, she suddenly 
switched from remembering to actually reliving the ex-
perience, somewhat like a waking nightmare. During this 
fl ashback the woman showed signs of intense distress which 
probably included physiological reactions such as shaking, 
gasping, or sobbing. Th e psychologist also observed concen-
tration and memory problems. Th is clinical picture strongly 
suggests that the woman would be likely to display similar 
symptoms during her refugee claim hearing, and that she 
was therefore a vulnerable person in need of procedural 
accommodations. Although the Board member in this in-
stance was visibly competent and caring, he appears to have 
misjudged the severity of the claimant’s impairment, prob-
ably in part because he did not fully understand the special-
ized terminology used by the psychologist. 
Federal Court Decisions
At the time of writing, there have been only two Federal 
Court cases involving Guideline 8. In Orozco,42 the Federal 
Court dismissed an application for judicial review of a deci-
sion refusing to reopen a refugee protection claim based on 
sexual orientation. Th e Court adopted a restrictive interpret-
ation of Guideline 8, asserting that “a duty to accommodate 
above and beyond those already built into the IRB processes 
is triggered only in cases of severe vulnerability where an 
applicant’s ability to present their cases [sic] is signifi cantly 
and considerably impaired.”43 Th e Court also interpreted the 
Guideline’s provisions concerning the content of expert re-
ports as if they established minimal standards, whereas they 
are more likely intended as a “best practices” model aimed 
at helping clinicians understand what information should 
ideally be included in a full-fl edged expert report.
Although both the RPD and the Federal Court discussed 
Guideline 8 at some length, it was arguably irrelevant to the 
proceedings. Th e initial claim was decided in 2005, before the 
adoption of Guideline 8. Th ere was no allegation of vulner-
ability, no psychologist’s report, and no request for procedur-
al accommodations at the initial refugee protection hearing. 
Nor did subsequent counsel identify any accommodations 
that should have been made. Th e issue of vulnerability was 
fi rst raised at the application to reopen, based on a psych-
ologist’s assessment conducted 15 months aft er the refugee 
hearing. Th e issue before both the RPD and the Federal 
Court was not whether the applicant was a vulnerable person 
as defi ned in Guideline 8, nor whether procedural accom-
modations should have been made, but instead, whether a 
breach of natural justice had occurred at the initial hearing.
In Sharma,44 the Federal Court rejected an application 
for judicial review of a decision refusing refugee status to an 
Indian man who claimed to have been tortured by the police 
aft er a bomb went off  in front of his offi  ce. His only son was 
also arrested and died of a brain hemorrhage while in police 
custody. Th e son’s body carried multiple marks of torture.
Th e IRB (correctly, in my view) refused a pre-hearing ap-
plication to designate a representative for the claimant and his 
wife but identifi ed them as vulnerable and allowed them to 
be accompanied by a support person at the hearing, based on 
reports by the claimants’ psychotherapist, social worker, and 
physician indicating that Mr. Sharma suff ered from PTSD 
and depression. Th e medical report, citing X-ray results, also 
indicated that Mr. Sharma suff ered from ongoing pain and 
limping due to a hip stress fracture, allegedly caused by hav-
ing been suspended from the ceiling by his feet for extended 
periods during police interrogation. Th is was consistent with 
Indian hospital records documenting the treatment received 
immediately aft er the alleged torture. His wife was diagnosed 
with anxiety and major cardiac problems. 
Th e Federal Court decision is troubling for two main rea-
sons. First, the Federal Court asserts that it is entirely up to 
the Board member to decide whether the claimants’ psycho-
logical vulnerability aff ected their ability to testify, without 
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even discussing the Board’s decision to totally discount all 
four medical and psychological reports submitted by the 
claimants. In particular, the Court said nothing about the 
Board’s complete failure to discuss the Canadian medical 
report linking the claimant’s physical injuries to the alleged 
torture as well as confi rming his psychological problems. 
Th is is contrary to the well-established principle that the 
Board must consider the psychological or medical evidence 
before it,45 particularly a report based in part on objective 
evidence such as an X-ray.46 Second, the Court concluded 
that “the Board member” was sensitive to the claimants’ 
vulnerability and made the necessary procedural accommo-
dations, ignoring the fact that two separate members were 
involved. Procedural accommodations were made by the 
Coordinating Member, who indeed seemed sensitive to the 
claimants’ vulnerability, whereas the presiding member was 
openly confrontational and not in the least sensitive. Th e 
Court seems to imply that once procedural accommodations 
have been made, refugee claimants cannot subsequently 
argue that their psychological vulnerability prevented them 
from adequately presenting their case. Th is is incompatible 
with the remedial purpose of Guideline 8 and more particu-
larly with s. 10.1, which states:
Th e IRB ensures that all those who appear at its hearings or other 
proceedings are questioned with sensitivity and respect. Th is 
obligation is all the more important in the case of vulnerable 
persons. In probing the information provided by the person, the 
IRB will attempt to avoid traumatizing or re-traumatizing the 
vulnerable person.47
Th e fact that procedural accommodations have been made 
in no way decreases the Board’s obligation to show a particu-
larly high level of sensitivity and respect to vulnerable per-
sons and to do everything in its power to avoid traumatizing 
them. Th is is incumbent on the Board in all cases in which a 
person has been recognized as vulnerable, without any need 
for counsel to explicitly remind the Board of its obligations.  
In the Sharma case, the transcript of the IRB hearing 
shows that the Refugee Protection Offi  cer and the presid-
ing Board member, Sajjad Randhawa, took turns aggres-
sively questioning the claimants, focusing on minute details 
and minor inconsistencies. Despite the chaotic and hostile 
manner in which he was questioned, the principal claimant’s 
testimony was dignifi ed and coherent. Indeed, the claimants 
told the same story throughout the proceedings, from the in-
itial port-of-entry interview through detention proceedings 
to the refugee status hearing. Th e medical and psychological 
evidence was consistent with the claimant’s description of the 
torture he underwent. Aft er reading the entire Federal Court 
fi le, I believe that the Board hearing was profoundly unfair 
and that the Board decision fl ies in the face of the evidence. 
It would be of little theoretical interest to discuss the Board’s 
decision in any detail because it focused on the particular 
facts of the case. Furthermore, the Board simply ignored that 
the claimants had been identifi ed as vulnerable without dis-
cussing the issue.
It is perhaps paradoxical that, despite the hostile question-
ing and his well-documented psychological problems, Mr. 
Sharma’s testimony was frank, plausible, and consistent. Th e 
problem did not lie with his inability to present his case, but 
rather with the Board member’s failure to fairly and compe-
tently examine the evidence.
Is Serious Vulnerability Exceptional?
Guideline 8 is premised on the assumption that only a small 
proportion of the individuals appearing before the Board are 
vulnerable enough to require procedural accommodations. 
However, the scientifi c literature on psychological diffi  cul-
ties among adult asylum seekers suggests that this premise 
is erroneous (and this, without even taking into account 
vulnerabilities not due to mental health problems): fi rst, be-
cause the prevalence of mental health diffi  culties tends to be 
quite high among asylum seekers during the fi rst few years 
following their arrival, which is generally the period during 
which they will be involved in proceedings before the Board; 
and second, because many of these mental health problems 
are likely to impair the person’s ability to adequately present 
their case before the Board. Th is question is too complex to 
examine in any depth in this paper, so I will just mention 
a few quick facts about the prevalence and impact of post-
traumatic stress disorder and depression, the mental disor-
ders that most commonly aff ect asylum seekers.
Asylum seekers are highly likely to suff er from PTSD 
and depression because they typically have been exposed to 
multiple traumatic events involving interpersonal violence, 
have suff ered multiple losses, and are subject to considerable 
stress and insecurity linked to exile and the refugee claims 
process itself. Th e likelihood of developing PTSD is generally 
much higher in response to interpersonal violence, especially 
sexual violence, than following non-intentional trauma.48 In 
addition, the probability of suff ering from PTSD usually in-
creases with the number of traumatic events to which the 
person is exposed.49 In Mexico, for example, a study found 
that rates of PTSD were double the single-trauma rate among 
adults who had experienced two to three traumas, and tri-
ple the single-trauma rate among adults with four or more 
traumas.50 Repeated traumatization not only increases the 
risk of developing PTSD but also reduces the likelihood of 
recovery, and is oft en associated with particularly severe and 
chronic mental health problems.
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PTSD prevalence tends to be high in confl ict zones. For 
example, a 1998 study of a large representative sample of 
the population of Algiers who had been exposed to wide-
spread massacres for several years found that 37 per cent of 
the population had experienced full PTSD symptoms.51 In 
countries that have gone through prolonged and extreme 
confl ict, rates of PTSD may remain high for many years post-
confl ict. Th us, the same study found a PTSD prevalence of 28 
per cent in a representative sample of the Cambodian popu-
lation, some twenty years aft er the Khmer Rouge genocide 
and about eight years aft er low-intensity warfare had end-
ed.52 Th is is far higher than the 8 per cent lifetime prevalence 
in the United States.53
Individuals with PTSD are highly likely to also experi-
ence other mental disorders, particularly depression.54 In 
Australia, for example, almost 60 per cent of individuals who 
had suff ered from PTSD in the previous year had also ex-
perienced major depression during that period.55 High rates 
of concurrent PTSD and depression are common among 
resettled refugees and asylum seekers.56 Functional impair-
ment is typically far greater among persons diagnosed with 
both PTSD and depression than those diagnosed with PTSD 
alone.57
Recurrent, involuntary, and distressing re-experiencing 
of the traumatic events is the hallmark of PTSD. Typically, 
the person is periodically fl ooded with vivid images (and 
sometimes sounds, smells and other bodily sensations) 
of the traumatic events, both during waking hours and in 
nightmares. Intrusive recollections are oft en triggered by re-
minders of the traumatic events, which may include seem-
ingly innocuous cues (for example, seeing a red truck aft er 
a serious accident involving a similar vehicle).58 Although 
traumatic memories are vivid, they are oft en narrowly fo-
cused on the core features of the event while peripheral 
features are not encoded.59 For example, hold-up victims 
may be so intensely focused on the aggressor’s gun that 
they do not register details of the person’s face or clothing. 
Perception of time is oft en distorted in relation to traumatic 
events.60 In some cases, confusion or inability to remem-
ber details about traumatic events may occur because the 
person is overwhelmed by intense emotions that paralyze 
her ability to think clearly (somewhat akin to “blanking out” 
because of severe anxiety about tests or public speaking). 
Insomnia and diffi  culty concentrating are also very com-
mon PTSD symptoms. Th ese diffi  culties are compounded 
when the person is also depressed.61 Depression frequently 
leads not only to diffi  culty concentrating and a general slow-
ing of mental processes, but also to a general listlessness and 
sense of despair which may prevent the person from pre-
senting their case convincingly. All of these symptoms can 
seriously impair claimants’ ability to present their case dur-
ing proceedings before the IRB.62
Th e IRB Training Manual on Victims of Torture
Th e IRB Training Manual on Victims of Torture63 is, with 
some notable exceptions, a remarkably thorough, well-in-
formed, and thoughtful document on dealing with asylum 
seekers and refugees who have been subjected to torture. As 
suggested in Guideline 8, much of the manual is also highly 
relevant when dealing with other vulnerable persons, particu-
larly the many asylum seekers and refugees who have been ex-
posed to other forms of organized violence such as rape, civil 
war, police brutality, death threats, domestic violence, and 
so on. Th e manual discusses issues such as the eff ect of post-
traumatic stress on memory, concentration, and ability to tell 
one’s story and the implications for credibility assessment. It 
also describes in considerable detail best practices for deci-
sion makers and RPOs when questioning vulnerable persons, 
advocating a technique based on the “Golden Rule,” which is 
to “Let the claimants tell their stories in their own words and 
at their own pace.”64 Th e manual makes detailed suggestions 
for techniques to put the claimant at ease and build a rela-
tionship of respect and trust, as well as suggestions on how 
to approach sensitive topics such as torture or sexual abuse 
in a way that balances the need to probe the claim and test 
credibility, on the one hand, and to avoid re-traumatizing the 
claimant, on the other. Since Guideline 8 clearly encourages 
decision makers and RPOs to adopt the approach described 
in the Training Manual when dealing with vulnerable claim-
ants, counsel could certainly draw upon it to support requests 
for a non-confrontational hearing in which the claimant is 
invited to describe the alleged incidents “in his or her own 
words and without interruption.”65   
Although the information in the Training Manual on 
Victims of Torture is generally excellent, it contains a number 
of seriously misleading statements in its section “Malingering 
and PTSD.”66 Th ese misconceptions appear to be largely based 
on a single article by Michael R. Harris and Philip J. Resnick, 
a continuing education text designed to teach mental health 
professionals techniques for the diff erential diagnosis of sus-
pected malingerers in a clinical setting.67 Th e original article 
contains a number of oversimplifi cations, and the authors of 
the IRB Training Manual also appear to have misinterpreted 
some portions of the article. Here are some responses to the 
main misconceptions in the Training Manual’s “Malingering 
and PTSD” section.
Misconception 1: Mental health professionals can be easily 
fooled by malingerers because diagnosis of PTSD and other 
mental disorders rests essentially on unverifi able self-reported 
symptoms. Mental disorders are easy to fake because defi ned 
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by subjective criteria and lists of symptoms are easily avail-
able.
Th is is similar to saying that IRB decision makers are eas-
ily fooled because their decision rests almost entirely on the 
claimant’s testimony, with little independent evidence to cor-
roborate or contradict it. While it is true that deciding refu-
gee claims presents a challenge, competent decision makers 
who know how to question a claimant and assess credibility, 
who are well-informed about country conditions, and who 
carefully examine all the evidence should generally be able to 
make well-founded decisions (although, like mental health 
professionals, they are not infallible!).
Although Harris and Resnick do write that PTSD is easy 
to fake because it is defi ned almost completely by subjective 
criteria and because lists of symptoms are easily available, 
they then go on to describe a series of techniques that allow 
detection of such malingering. Th ese elementary techniques 
are familiar to any competent mental health professional. For 
example, Harris and Resnick write:
Inconsistency between the reported symptoms and clinical 
observations, the patient’s reports and collateral history, symp-
tom patterns with known psychiatric illnesses, or the patient’s 
reported symptoms and their actual known functioning are all 
frequently seen in malingerers. Clinicians should be particularly 
careful to ask open-ended questions in suspected malingerers 
and let patients tell their complete story with few interruptions. 
Details can be clarifi ed later with specifi c questions.68
Further, they also write:
Th e clinician should insist on detailed descriptions of symptoms. 
Malingering patients may know which symptoms to report but 
may be unable to give convincing descriptions or examples from 
their personal life. Behavioral observations during the examina-
tion may assist in evaluating symptoms of irritability, exagger-
ated startle response and diffi  culty concentrating.69
Again, one can draw a parallel with situation facing a 
Board member listening to an asylum seeker reciting a story 
“acquired” from a smuggler. At one level, one might say that 
it is easy for asylum seekers to draw on published accounts 
of successful claims to concoct a story calculated to fool 
Board members. On the other hand, a skilful Board member 
will, in most cases, quickly realize that the claimant’s story is 
paper-thin and that she is unable to elaborate on the back-
ground circumstances surrounding the fabricated narrative. 
Likewise, it is indeed relatively easy for would-be malinger-
ers to fi nd descriptions of psychiatric symptoms and to recite 
them during an assessment, but this defi nitely does not mean 
that they can easily deceive a competent professional.
Mental health professionals conducting a clinical as-
sessment do not rely solely on the patient’s self-reported 
symptoms (e.g., nightmares, insomnia) but also base their 
assessment on direct observation of the patient’s behaviour. 
According to DSM-IV criteria,70 for example, clinicians can-
not pose a diagnosis of PTSD on the basis of self-reported 
symptoms alone; they must also observe certain specifi c 
behaviours such as exaggerated startle response, hypervigi-
lance, irritability, or diffi  culty concentrating during the as-
sessment interview. Such behaviours are very diffi  cult to 
fake. More generally, mental health professionals undergo 
years of training during which accurate diagnosis of mental 
disorders is of central importance, as well as seeing dozens, if 
not hundreds, of patients suff ering from such disorders over 
the years. Th ey learn to reliably recognize the constellation 
of self-reported symptoms and behaviours that characterize 
diff erent disorders. Part of their job is to detect malingering 
or exaggeration of symptoms, not only for the purpose of ex-
pert reports but also in order to decide whether medication 
or other treatment is warranted.
Misconception 2: Mental health professionals are reluctant 
to consider the possibility of malingering, even in obvious situ-
ations, for fear of damaging the therapeutic relationship based 
on unconditional acceptance.
Mental health professionals perform two main functions, 
assessment and treatment, involving two distinct attitudes 
and skill sets. During assessment, the professional’s main 
concern is to accurately identify the precise nature of the per-
son’s mental health problems. A clinical assessment typical-
ly involves a series of detailed questions about the person’s 
current diffi  culties; their emotional, cognitive, and physical 
symptoms; the circumstances in which the symptoms fi rst 
appeared and how they evolved over time; relevant family 
and personal history; current psychosocial circumstances 
that may impact the person’s mental state. While question-
ing the patient, the clinician will of course be attentive to the 
behaviours indicative of the person’s cognitive and emotional 
state, such as body language, facial expressions, paralinguis-
tic cues, emotional expression, nervousness, slow reactions, 
apathy, etc. Th e clinician will also closely monitor the patient’s 
narrative for any sign of concentration problems, incoher-
ence, bizarre ideation, etc. In most cases, the clinician will 
have formed a working hypothesis quite early in the assess-
ment process because the person’s symptoms and behaviours 
fi t a recognizable diagnostic pattern that the professional has 
learned to identify through years of training and experience. 
Th e rest of the interview will serve to test the hypothesis, to 
fl esh out the diagnosis, and to better understand the needs 
of this particular patient. If clinicians note any apparent in-
consistencies or exaggerations in the patient’s account, they 
will probe further to determine whether this is a sign of ma-
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lingering or, on the contrary, an indication that the person’s 
problems are more severe than initially thought or that the 
diagnosis should be revised.
Accuracy is of paramount importance during assessment. 
Although making moral judgments about patients is to be 
avoided, making well-informed cognitive judgments about 
the patient’s condition is at the heart of mental health pro-
fessionals’ expertise and training. Detection of malingering 
is important for clinical as well as forensic reasons in order 
to avoid prescribing unnecessary medications or other treat-
ment.
During treatment, the role of the mental health profession-
al shift s to a focus on empathic listening and support. Th is is 
the stage at which many schools of psychotherapy advocate 
an attitude of unconditional acceptance, which means that 
the therapist should listen to the patient and try to under-
stand her on her own terms in order to build the relationship 
of trust that is essential to psychotherapy. Th roughout the 
treatment process, however, the professional will continue to 
monitor behavioural and narrative cues in order to further 
refi ne the diagnosis.
Harris and Resnick’s assertion that psychiatrists are oft en 
reluctant to consider the possibility of malingering is based 
on studies conducted in clinical contexts such as emergency 
rooms rather than a forensic context. Th ey quite rightly point 
out that in a clinical context, mental health professionals 
should be cautious before concluding that a patient is malin-
gering because of the risk of overlooking symptoms of sui-
cidal ideation, potential psychotic decompensation, or other 
serious problems. Even patients who exaggerate or fabricate 
symptoms may well have other, genuine mental health prob-
lems. Again, there are parallels in the fi eld of refugee protec-
tion. For example, individuals who have genuinely suff ered 
persecution sometimes make the mistake of basing their claim 
for asylum on a fabricated story because some unscrupulous 
smuggler has assured them that it’s a winner. Others may lie 
about certain facts out of fear that they might be detrimental 
to their claim. Although lie detection is important, clinicians 
need to keep in mind that a person who malingering or exag-
gerating symptoms may be genuinely ill, just as IRB decision 
makers should remind themselves that a person who is lying 
or embellishing may nonetheless be a genuine refugee.
Misconception 3: “Psychiatrist’s ability to detect lies in stran-
gers is little better than chance” and their confi dence in their 
ability to detect malingering is unrelated to their actual ability.
Th is statement is extraordinarily misleading. In support 
of this assertion, Harris and Resnick quote Paul Ekman’s 
1985 book Telling Lies.71 In fact, Ekman states that scientifi c 
studies show that “few people do better than chance in judg-
ing whether someone is lying or truthful,”72 and that this ap-
plies not only to the general population but also to profes-
sionals whose job involves detection of deception, be they 
psychiatrists, police offi  cers, polygraph examiners, or others. 
Furthermore, the person’s confi dence in their ability to de-
tect lies is unrelated to their actual ability. In the twenty years 
since Ekman wrote these words, multiple scientifi c studies 
of deception detection have confi rmed his fi ndings, consist-
ently showing that not only psychiatrists and clinical psych-
ologists, but also judges, police offi  cers, customs offi  cials, 
parole offi  cers, polygraph examiners, and auditors are on 
average no better than non-professionals in detecting decep-
tion, which means little better than chance.73 A recent paper 
reviewing the results of over two hundred scientifi c studies 
involving a total of more than 24,000 participants confi rmed 
that professionals whose job involves detection of deception 
were in general no more accurate at lie detection than the 
general population, and that average accuracy is about 54 per 
cent (just 4 per cent better than chance).74 Th e only profes-
sional groups who appeared to be somewhat more accur-
ate at detecting deception were US Secret Service and CIA 
agents, although this fi nding may well be spurious because 
of small group size.75 Psychiatrists and clinical psychologists 
were at least as good as US federal and state judges at distin-
guishing truth from lies, although both judges and mental 
health professionals were only very slightly better than the 
general population.76 Th e same studies show that there is 
little or no relation between confi dence in one’s ability to de-
tect deception and actual ability. On the other hand, some 
individuals are consistently above average in their ability to 
detect deception, but this appears to be linked to their cogni-
tive style rather than to their profession, gender, age, or other 
demographic characteristics.77 Several studies indicate that 
observing a person over a longer period of time and, better 
yet, in diff erent contexts tends to increase accuracy.78  
Studies of deception detection generally involve viewing 
a brief videotaped excerpt of a person either lying or telling 
the truth about a particular event. Th is is similar to the task 
facing a mental health professional or an IRB decision maker 
who is trying to decide whether a refugee claimant is tell-
ing the truth about the traumatic events experienced in the 
country of origin. However, it may well be somewhat diff er-
ent from the main task performed by mental health profes-
sionals during assessments, which is to determine whether 
a constellation of symptoms and behaviours are consistent 
with a typical diagnostic picture. In the latter case, the clin-
ician is comparing the symptoms displayed and recounted by 
the patient to a diagnostic template. It would seem plausible 
that it would be easier for a clinician to accurately identify 
symptoms that are inconsistent with a diagnostic template 
about which she is an expert than to judge the veracity of 
a narrative about a unique incident, which cannot be com-
pared to a template and about which the listener has no 
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specialized knowledge. In other words, I would predict that 
mental health professionals’ ability to detect malingering 
would generally be considerably better than chance because 
this involves identifying deviations from a characteristic pat-
tern of symptoms that the professional has seen many times 
before. Be that as it may, the one thing that has been con-
clusively demonstrated by multiple scientifi c studies is that 
mental health professionals are at least as good as judges, 
customs offi  cials, police offi  cers, or the general population at 
distinguishing truth from lies.
Misconception 4: Mental health professionals “may” rely 
solely on symptom checklists or leading questions or self-re-
porting, not spend enough time with the patient, be swayed by 
vivid stories, not be suffi  ciently knowledgeable, or be otherwise 
incompetent or unprofessional
Th e Training Manual states that there are “a number of 
reasons why a claimant might be able to fool the ordinary 
professional,” notably because professionals “may” engage 
in a host of poor practices such as relying solely on leading 
questions or symptom checklists, not spending enough time 
with the patient, being swayed by vivid stories, not being suf-
fi ciently knowledgeable, and so on.79 Th is highly prejudicial 
assertion is purely hypothetical: a claimant “might” be able 
to fool a professional, who “may” be incompetent. Th ere is 
absolutely no evidence as to the frequency of such practi-
ces. Obviously, in any profession, be it mental health, law, or 
any other, one can fi nd individuals who are unethical or do 
shoddy work. Th is says nothing about the integrity or com-
petence of the profession as a whole.  
Some of the examples of supposed shoddy practices by 
mental health professionals are visibly based on misinter-
pretation of the quoted source. For example, the manual 
states, “In one study the use of leading questions or symptom 
checklists allowed malingerers unfamiliar with psychiatric 
disorders to qualify for diagnoses of major depression and 
posttraumatic stress disorder.”80 In fact, this was a study in 
which college students were provided with a list of symp-
toms drawn from the DSM-IV description of four disorders, 
including PTSD and depression, and asked to check off  the 
symptoms that they thought were experienced by people 
suff ering from these disorders.81 Not surprisingly, faced with 
a list of symptoms, a large proportion of the college students 
were able to guess which ones to endorse. Th is is very diff er-
ent from convincing a mental health professional that one is 
actually experiencing such symptoms during a face-to-face 
assessment interview or therapy session. 
In the real world, mental health professionals do not pose a 
diagnosis of PTSD or depression or any other diagnosis based 
only on the patient’s answers to a symptom checklist. To do so 
would be contrary to elementary professional ethics. In addi-
tion, many diagnoses cannot be made solely on the basis of 
self-reported symptoms. Before posing a diagnosis of PTSD, 
for example, the clinician must also observe certain behav-
iours and be convinced that the person’s ability to function in 
daily life is at least somewhat impaired. If used at all in the con-
text of a clinical assessment, questionnaires are fi lled out aft er 
the interview as an additional means to check the diagnosis. 
Symptom checklists are primarily used for research, particu-
larly in the context of anonymous studies in which respond-
ents have no incentive to invent or exaggerate symptoms.
Other assertions, such as “Th e professional may not spend 
enough time with the claimant” or “may not being [sic] suf-
fi ciently knowledgeable about PTSD and/torture [sic]”82 are 
not sourced and appear to be purely gratuitous. Th e manual 
certainly provides no evidence to support them.
Th e reason that I have discussed at such length the 
Training Manual’s misleading statements about mental 
health professionals is that such negative stereotypes of men-
tal health professionals appear to be quite pervasive within 
the IRB. Th is impression is based on interviews with former 
Board members and on analysis of a large number of recent 
Refugee Protection Division decisions (2004–2008) involv-
ing psychiatric or psychological evidence. It is certainly dis-
turbing to read such caricatural negative stereotypes in the 
Training Manual on Victims of Torture, which is otherwise a 
very thoughtful and well-researched document.  Even more 
disturbing, this type of negative stereotyping too oft en leads 
Board members to discount expert reports written by com-
petent mental health professionals and based on thorough 
clinical assessments.
Conclusion
Th e adoption of the Guideline on Procedures with Respect 
to Vulnerable Persons Appearing Before the IRB is clearly 
an important step in the right direction. Th us, it explicitly 
recognizes the principle that vulnerable persons appearing 
before the Board have the right to procedural accommoda-
tions to ensure that they receive a fair hearing. Th e Guideline 
defi nes sources of vulnerability in broad and inclusive terms 
and confi rms that Board members have considerable discre-
tion to devise procedural accommodations tailored to fi t the 
vulnerable person’s particular needs. Decision makers are 
strongly encouraged to adopt the approach proposed in the 
Training Manual on Victims of Torture when questioning vul-
nerable persons in order to minimize re-traumatization.  So 
far, the Board has accepted most applications made under 
Guideline 8, indicating that there is a genuine desire to take 
the needs of vulnerable persons into account.
For the moment Guideline 8 serves only to provide pro-
cedural accommodations. However, one can reasonably 
argue that in order to achieve the Guideline’s stated purpose 
of ensuring that vulnerable persons are not disadvantaged in 
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presenting their case, Board members should also take such 
persons’ psychological diffi  culties into account when assess-
ing their credibility. Such an interpretation would go a long 
way toward making the refugee protection processes fairer.
However, there are a number of problems with the 
Guideline. First, limiting application of the Guideline to 
cases involving exceptionally severe impairment is unduly 
restrictive. Procedural accommodations should be permitted 
whenever there is reason to believe that they might make it 
easier for the person to tell her story or decrease her level of 
distress. Second, Board members do not have the expertise 
to review a mental health professional’s opinion as to the ap-
plicant’s mental health status. For the purpose of procedural 
accommodations, a report by a qualifi ed mental health pro-
fessional concluding that the person has mental health prob-
lems likely to impair her ability to present her case should be 
treated as conclusive proof of vulnerability.
Ultimately, though, the main problem with Guideline 8 
is the fact that it is purely procedural and does not address 
the many other problems faced by vulnerable asylum seekers 
and permanent residents, briefl y outlined in the introduc-
tion to this paper. Th ere is an urgent need for immigration 
authorities, refugee rights advocates, and mental health pro-
fessionals to make a concerted eff ort to develop policies de-
signed to better meet the needs of vulnerable persons. It is 
to be hoped that the Guideline on Procedures with Respect to 
Vulnerable Persons Appearing Before the IRB will prove to be 
the fi rst step on a long road toward greater fairness for vul-
nerable persons seeking protection in Canada.
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